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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070874-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from guilty pleas to three counts of aggravated robbery 
(enhanced), a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 120-day disposition 
motion to dismiss where the record shows that good cause supported 
the delay that pushed defendant's proceedings beyond the 120-day 
disposition period? 
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss under the 120-day 
disposition statute for abuse of discretion. See State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416, \ 7, 
82 P.3d 219. This Court "'will find abuse of discretion only where there is no reasonable 
basis in the record to support the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of "good 
cause.'"" Id. (citations omitted). 
II. May this Court reach defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim where he did not raise that claim below or reserve that claim 
when he entered his Sery pleas? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes, attached at Addendum A, are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 10,2003, defendant was charged with eleven counts of enhanced 
aggravated robbery and one count of possession of a firearm by a restricted person (R. 1-
6). On May 1, 2003, a preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 10,2003 (R. 19-20). 
On May 5, 2003, the Utah State Prison received a Notice and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charge(s) filed by defendant (R. 21). 
After numerous continuances, a preliminary hearing was held on October 8,2003 
(R. 42-45). The trial court found sufficient evidence to bind defendant over on the 
underlying charges but not the enhancements. (Id). On October 20, 2003, the State filed 
an amended information (R. 48-50, 51-55). 
Following defendant's arraignment, a three-day trial was set to begin on November 
18,2003 (R. Tab 409:Tab4:l-2). After numerous continuances to allow defense counsel 
time to prepare for trial, trial was reset to begin June 8,2004 (R. 413:3-6, 21; R. 56, 59-
61,105-07). 
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On May 24, 2004, defendant told the trial court that he was dissatisfied with 
appointed counsel and wanted to hire private counsel (R. 129-31; R. 414:3-5, 9-10). 
When, in June, defendant had not yet retained new counsel, the trial court referred the 
matter back to the public defender's office for appointment of conflict counsel (R. 
409:Tab7:l-2). 
On July 14,2004, conflict counsel appeared (R. 409:Tab 8:1). Shortly thereafter, 
counsel filed a motion to dismiss under the 120-day disposition statute (R. 158-59, 161-
62). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 417:3-7, 
11; R. 222-23). Trial was reset for December 7,2004 (R. 417:8; R. 224-26). 
On November 29,2004, defendant again informed the court that he wanted to 
retain private counsel (R. 419:3-4). On December 10,2004, the State filed a second 
amended information (R. 262-68,269-75). Following several continuances to allow 
defendant to secure private counsel, new defense counsel entered his appearance on 
January 18, 2004 (R. 292-93, 320-21, 324). 
On January 24, 2005, defense counsel indicated that the parties may have reached 
a resolution of the case and asked for a brief continuance (Jan. 24, 2005 Tr. at 4-5). 
On February 14, 2005, defendant entered Sery pleas to three counts of aggravated 
robbery (R. 420 (transcript); R. 330-32, 336-43). As part of his plea agreement, 
defendant reserved the right to challenge the trial court's 120-day disposition ruling on 
appeal (R. 420:4). 
3 
On August 4,2005, defendant was sentenced to three consecutive terms of six-
years-to-life (R. 345-46). 
On November 8,2005, defendant filed a Manning motion to reinstate his right to 
appeal, which the trial court denied (R. 349-53, 359-60). On appeal, the parties stipulated 
to a summary reversal of the trial court's order. See State v. Larson, 2007 UT App 165U 
(per curiam). This Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the matter to the 
trial court. See id. On remand, the State stipulated to defendant's Manning motion, and 
the trial court granted it (R. 435-36,439). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 
441-42). The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for disposition (R. 448). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crimes.1 On April 2, 2002, after having been released on parole on an 
aggravated robbery conviction, defendant entered a Crown Burger restaurant with a firiend 
(R. 334 (PSI) at 3-6). Both were wearing beanies over their heads and/or bandanas over 
their faces (R. 411:10,20,29, 37,44-45, 59, 64, 72; PSI at 3-5). One was brandishing a 
gun; the other was brandishing a "long" knife (R. 411:10-11, 14-15, 21, 29, 31, 37,40, 
42,45,49, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 64, 69, 80). 
Inside the restaurant, defendant went to an office at the back of the store (PSI at 
3). There, he approached the two owners of the restaurant, held a gun to their faces, and 
because defendant entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea bargain before trial, the 
facts of the crimes are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript and defendant's 
presentence investigation report (PSI). 
4 
demanded that they open the store safe (R. 411:64-65, 70-71; PSI at 3, 6). In the safe was 
some $20,000 in cash and $100,000 in jewelry (R. 411:65, 70-72; PSI at 3, 6-7, 9). 
Defendant took the cash and jewelry, as well as the female owner's purse (R. 411:65, 70-
71; PSI at 3). 
Meanwhile, defendant's friend corralled the restaurant's employees and customers, 
ten people in total, into the dining area (R. 411:9,20, 22,26, 30-31, 37-38,45, 51, 59; PSI 
at 4-5). Threatening anyone who did not listen, the man told everyone to "[g]et on the 
floor" and "[e]mpty [their] pockets" (R. 411:21, 24, 31, 38-39,45, 51-52, 59; PSI at 4-5). 
At one point, the man in front called back to defendant and walked back to the 
office (R. 411:12,17,23, 26-27, 39-40,46, 55-56; PSI at 4). As he did, one of the 
victims ran out of the restaurant to a nearby store and called the police (R. 411:13, 26,40, 
55; PSI at 4). The man then returned with a gun and collected the "wallet[s], money, 
keys, [and] credit cards" that lay on the floor (R. 411:21,40,42,49, 52, 56, 60; PSI at 4-
5). He and defendant then ran out the restaurant's back door (R. 411:27, 34,41,49, 56, 
71-72; PSI at 3-4, 6). 
Outside, the two men approached a waiting vehicle in the parking lot (R. 411:79-
80; PSI at 3-4). One of the men pointed a gun at the driver and ordered him out of the car 
(R. 411:80; PSI at 3). As the driver got out, the man with the gun told him to "[t]hrow 
[the] keys back in the car" (R. 411:81). The driver complied and then ran to the back 
door of the restaurant, where the male owner let him in (R. 411:81). Defendant and his 
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friend then got into the vehicle, while the male owner of the restaurant retrieved his 
pistol from a filing cabinet (R. 411:73; PSI at 3-4). Several shots where fired, and the 
man on the passenger side of the vehicle fled (R. 411:73-74; PSI at 3-4, 6). Defendant 
later reported that a bullet must have come through the windshield because "he was hit 
with a piece of lead in the face" (PSI at 6). 
The stolen vehicle was found later with bullet holes "through the windshield, the 
hood and one in the front driver's side fender" (PSI at 5). Several wallets, loose cash, and 
some 9mm casings were found inside the vehicle (Id.). In addition, the passenger side of 
the vehicle had "a blood mark on the right side and blood drops on the seat, the side panel 
and the ground" (Id.). Samples of the blood were collected for DNA testing and 
subsequently matched to defendant (Id.). Neither defendant nor his friend, however, were 
immediately apprehended. 
A short while later, police received information from an anonymous source 
identifying defendant and a man named Joseph Sanchez as the perpetrators of the Crown 
Burger robbery (PSI at 5). At the time, defendant was already back in prison on a parole 
violation (Id.). 
Defendant's disposition motion. The following events occurred between May 5, 
2003, the date on which defendant's 120-disposition notice was received, and August 13, 
2004, the date on which the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss under the 
Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (the UMDDA): 
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June 10,2003 - Defense counsel moves to continue the preliminary hearing (R. 
409:1). Defense counsel explains that "we talked about this on Monday and 
figured that with eleven witnesses plus the discussion this morning 
(inaudible), we're going to ask for a special setting" (Id). The prosecutor 
indicates she could be ready in "two weeks, possibly a week" (Id). When 
the magistrate suggests a hearing date of June 24, the prosecutor states that 
she "can't do that" because she had "a trial four days" that week (Id. at 2). 
When the magistrate offers July 3, both the prosecutor and defense counsel 
indicate July 3 "works" (Id; R. 24-25). 
July 2,2003 - Preliminary hearing continued to July 14, 2003 (Docket at 7). No 
indication in record concerning who requested the continuance. 
July 14,2003 - Defense counsel moves to continue the preliminary hearing 
because "the federal government is deciding whether or not they want to 
charge this" (R. 409:Tab 2:1). The prosecutor states that she has "been 
pretty aggressive with the U.S. Attorney's office to try to get them to make 
a decision" and that she "will call [the] U.S. Attorney... again today" (Id.). 
The hearing is rescheduled for July 28, 2003 (Id; R. 27). 
July 28,2003 - Defense counsel moves again for a continuance "to see whether or 
not the federal government [is] going to file charges" because, "[i]f they 
[are], the State [is] going to dismiss on this" (R. 409:Tab 3:1). Thus, 
counsel continues, "what we both decided is we just need to set this for a 
preliminary hearing" and asks for "a special setting" (Id.). The prosecutor 
again states that she has "been diligently trying to get an answer from the 
U.S. Attorney's Office and I'm going to continue to do that" (Id.). The 
magistrate indicates that "I can't give you a definite time until October, but 
I only have one jury set on August 27th and I'll know by the 18th whether 
that's going or not" (R. 409:Tab 3:2). Counsel and the magistrate agree to 
retain the dates of both August 27 and October 8, "just in case" (R. 409:Tab 
3:2-3; R. 28-29). 
Aug. 27,2003 - Defense counsel fails to appear for the preliminary hearing (R. 
410:3). The magistrate calls counsel's office and learns that counsel 
"doesn't have this down on the calendar," even though he "was here when 
this was set" (R. 410:5). After approximately 15 minutes, the magistrate 
holds defense counsel in contempt and strikes the hearing (R. 410:5-6; R. 
30-32, 35-39). The magistrate notes that defense counsel's absence "has 
delayed proceedings that have affected the court and all of th[e twelve 
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witnesses] . . . and I find that that has interfered with judicial process" (R. 
410:6). The magistrate tells defendant that, although "you are entitled to a 
speedy trial[,] . . . I'm not going to count this against the State for failure to 
try the case because it's your attorney's fault that it's delayed" (R. 410:6-7). 
When defendant asks, "How can I be held to account for another person 
when I have no power over him?," the magistrate responds, "It's a good 
question" but, "if you need an attorney, we wouldn't presume to try to get 
you to go to court without one" (R. 410:7). Preliminary hearing reset for 
October 8, 2003 (R. 31). 
Oct. 8,2003 - Preliminary hearing held (R. 42-45), The trial court finds sufficient 
evidence to bind defendant over on the underlying charges but not the 
enhancements (Id.). On October 20, 2003, the State files amended 
information (R. 48-50, 51-55). 
Oct. 20,2003 - At defendant's arraignment hearing, defense counsel indicates the 
trial will take three days (R. 409:Tab 4:1). When the trial court suggests 
dates in mid-November, defense counsel responds, "[m]y only concern is 
that he has filed 120 day disposition on this case. I'm free on those dates" 
(Id.). After a brief discussion concerning when defendant's notice was filed 
and noting that 120 days had already passed from the date of the filing, trial 
set for November 18-20, 2003 (R. 409:Tab 4:1-2). 
Nov. 7,2003 - Defense counsel files written motion to continue trial to which the 
State stipulates (R. 56). 
Nov. 10,2003 - At the pretrial conference hearing, defense counsel argues 
his motion to continue. Counsel notes that "this was set pretty quickly 
because [defendant] at the time had filed a 120-day disposition" (R. 
412:3)." However, "[t]his case boils down to basically DNA . . . and I'm 
going to need to have some time to get all the results from the State and 
have an expert look at those" (Id.). Defense counsel states that defendant 
agrees to the continuance (R. 412:3-4). When the court comments, 
"[u]nless any charges can be dismissed for the 120 days," defense counsel 
notes that "I have gone back over and looked at the docket and there's been 
some—quite a few continuances but most of them either have been agreed 
to by us or were asked by us, and including the one of them which was my 
fault So I don't think there's any ground for the 120-day disposition 
(Id.). The trial court then addresses defendant, stating that "I will only 
continue [the trial] if you are willing to waive any right you have to a 
8 
speedy trial and you agree not to raise any more issues regarding this 120-
day disposition" (R. 412:5). When defendant asks "[h]ow many days is it 
that we have in favor for my behalf with the 120 days," defense counsel 
responds, "all I can tell you is that almost every continuance we've had we 
agreed to it so every time appearing after that doesn't count toward the 120 
days" (Id). Defendant responds, "I understand, I'd like to waive my 
right" (Id.). When the trial court warns defendant that a continuance would 
mean no 'trial date until sometime after the first of the year," defendant 
confirms his waiver (Id). After defense counsel indicates he is not 
available for trial during the court's open dates in February, trial is set for 
March 24-26,2004 (R. 412:6; R. 59-61). Defense counsel informs the 
court that defendant "just told me that's okay" (R. 412:6). 
Nov. 24,2003 - Defense counsel files discovery request for information related to 
DNA evidence (R. 72-73). On or about December 4,2003, defense counsel 
subpoenas DNA information from Utah State Crime Lab (R. 76-77). 
Jan. 13,2004 - Defendant is paroled from the Utah State Prison and booked 
into jail on current charges (R. 409:Tab 5:1; R. 81-82; PSI at 7). 
Feb. 10,2004 - Defense counsel files a written motion to continue trial to allow 
DNA expert sufficient time to review material in this case (R. 97-98, 101). 
Feb. 20,2004 - Defense counsel argues his motion to continue, stating that he 
just received the necessary supplemental data from the crime lab and his 
DNA expert needs more time to prepare for trial (R. 413:11-13, 14). The 
prosecutor objects to a continuance (R. 413:13). Defendant then confirms 
he is "willing to waive his speedy trial rights" (R. 413:15). Defense counsel 
states he understands the trial might be pushed back to June (R. 413:15). 
When defendant states that he does not waive any speedy trial rights that 
have already accumulated but only "anything from this point on," the court 
states, "Well, then, we're not going to continue the trial" (R. 413: 16). 
After further discussion, defendant waives his right to a speedy trial (R. 
413:16-21). Trial is continued to June 8-10,2004 (R. 413:21-22; R. 107). 
May 24,2004 - At the pretrial conference, defendant tells the court that he is 
dissatisfied with defense counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss under 
the UMDDA and that he wants to hire a private attorney (R. 414:3-5). The 
court explains that "you just need to understand that the 120-day detainer 
disposition is gone.... You've waived every time we've talked to you 
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about continuing this trial, so that's not an issue" (R. 414:6). Defendant 
responds, "Yeah, I understand that," but then continues to disagree that his 
detainer issue has been waived (R. 414:7-8). The State objects to a 
continuance (R. 414:8). After the court addresses the State's objection, 
defendant asks for a continuance to hire an attorney (R. 414:9). The court 
grants defendant's request and sets scheduling conference for June 28, 2004 
(R. 414:10; R. 129-31). 
June 28,2004 - At a scheduling hearing, defendant tells the court that he has 
not yet retained private counsel (R. 409:Tab 7:1). The court refers the case 
to the public defender's office for appointment of conflict counsel and 
schedules a hearing for July 12, 2004 (R. 409:Tab 7:1-2; R. 135-36). 
July 12,2004 - Counsel from the public defender's office appears on defendant's 
behalf but notes that conflict counsel must be appointed (R. 409:Tab 8:1-2). 
The prosecutor objects to any continuance (R. 409:Tab 8:2-3). After 
defendant waives his right to a speedy trial, the court continues the matter 
for appointment of conflict counsel (R. 409:Tab 8:6; R. 137-38). 
July 14,2004 - New counsel appears on defendant's behalf and states that he 
intends to file a motion to dismiss under the UMDDA (R. 409:Tab 9:1; R. 
147-49,150). A hearing on defendant's motion is set for August 4,2004 
(R. 409:Tab 8:3; R. 148). After discussion regarding defendant's waiver of 
his 120-day disposition and speedy trial rights, the court reschedules trial 
for August 24-26, 2004 (R. 148-49). 
July 29,2004 - Defendant files his motion to dismiss (R. 158-59, 161-62). State 
opposes the motion (R. 165-221). 
Aug. 4,2004 - An evidentiary hearing is held on defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 
416 (transcript); R. 222-23). Defendant and defendant's original trial 
counsel testify. The court takes the matter under advisement, indicating it 
will issue an oral ruling on August 13,2004 (R. 416:112; R. 222-23). 
On August 13,2004, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, 
concluding that "[a]s of the date of the Court's ruling in this matter, August 13,2003, 
[71] days of the 120-day disposition period [under the UMDDA] have expired" (R. 241 
10 
(Conclusion 11)). The trial court made the following findings and conclusions in support 
of its ruling: 
May 5,2003 to June 10,2003. Thirty-eight days of the disposition period 
"expired between the date that the Defendant gave notice of his request for 
disposition, May 5,2003, and the date of the first scheduled Preliminary 
Hearing, June 10,2003 (R. 241 (Conclusion 9)). 
June 10,2003 to July 14,2003. "Due to the high number of preliminary hearings 
scheduled [on June 10,2003], counsel stipulated to a continuance of the 
Preliminary Hearing until July 14,2003." Thus, good cause supported a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing to July 14,2003. (R. 238 (Finding 
2); R. 240 (Conclusion 1)). 
July 14,2003 to August 27,2003. On July 14, 2003, and July 28, 2003, defense 
counsel stipulated to continuances of the preliminary hearing to "await[] a 
determination by the U.S. Attorney's Office whether federal charges would 
be filed against the Defendant." Those continuances, therefore, were 
supported by good cause and attributable to defendant. (R. 239 (Findings 3, 
4); R. 240 (Conclusions 2, 3)). 
August 27,2003 to October 8,2003. On August 27, 2003, defense counsel failed 
to appear for the preliminary hearing. Thus, the matter was continued to 
October 8,2003. Defense counsel's "failure to appear" constituted good 
cause to continue the hearing, and, therefore, such delay was attributable to 
defendant (R. 239 (Finding 5); R. 240 (Conclusion 4)). 
October 8,2003 to November 10,2003. Thirty-three days of the disposition 
period expired between the date of the preliminary hearing on October 8, 
2003, and the pretrial conference scheduled for November 10, 2003 (R. 239 
(Finding 6); R. 241 (Conclusion 10)). 
November 10,2003 to June 8,2004. On November 10, 2003, upon defense 
counsel's motion, the trial was continued to March 24-26,2004. On 
February 12, 2004, upon defendant's motion, the trial was continued to June 
8-10,2004. Defendant's motions constituted good cause for the 
continuances. Thus, the delay between November 10, 2003 to June 8, 2004, 
was attributable to defendant (R. 239 (Findings 7, 8); R. 240-41 
(Conclusions 5, 6)). 
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June 8,2004 to August 24,2004. On May 24, 2004, defendant moved "to 
dismiss court-appointed counsel and to retain private counsel" and "was 
given 60 days to secure counsel." When defendant failed to retain counsel 
by July 12, 2004, the court appointed conflict counsel. When new counsel 
appeared on July 14,2004 and "informed the Court that the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss was forthcoming," the trial was continued to August 24-
26, 2004. Defendant's request for new counsel constituted "good cause to 
delay the trial" from June 2004 to August 2004. Thus, such delay was 
attributable to Defendant" (R. 239-40 (Finding 9); R. 241 (Conclusion 7)). 
Following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel moved to continue the trial because he 
was "not ready to do a trial concerning DNA" and needed "sufficient time to prepare" (R. 
417:6-7). Over the prosecutor's objection, the trial court granted counsel's motion and 
reset trial for December 7-9, 2004 (R. 417:7, 8,11; R. 224-26). The court found "good 
cause to delay the trial" based on counsel's request for a continuance; thus, the delay 
would not count toward the 120-day disposition period (R. 241 (Conclusions 8, 11)). 
At the pretrial conference on November 29, 2004, defendant informed the court 
that he wanted to retain private counsel. Over the prosecutor's objection, the court 
allowed defense counsel to withdraw, struck the trial dates, and scheduled a hearing for 
December 13, 2004 (R. 419:4-6). On December 10, 2004, the State filed a second 
amended information (R. 262-68, 269-75). 
When defendant appeared without counsel on December 13, 2004, the trial court 
set the matter over to January 3,2005 (R. 292-93). When defendant appeared without 
counsel on January 3,2005, the court set the matter over to January 24, 2005 (R. 320-21). 
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On January 24,2005, new counsel appeared on defendant's behalf and asked for a 
brief continuance because the parties may have reached a resolution of the case. After 
defendant waived his right to a speedy trial, the court set the matter for disposition on 
February 14,2005 (Jan. 24, 2005 Tr. at 4-5). On February 14, 2005, defendant entered 
his Sery pleas (R. 330-31, 336-43). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). First, 
defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion without first making 
express findings concerning whether the prosecutor had fulfilled her duties under the 
UMDDA. Second, defendant asserts that the trial court improperly counted continuances 
against defendant where, according to defendant, all the delay in the proceedings were 
caused by the prosecutor's dilatory conduct. 
Defendant's first claim of error fails because defendant did not raise it below, nor 
did he reserve his right to appeal this claim in his Sery pleas. Thus, under well-
established law, defendant waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas. This 
Court, therefore, should not reach defendant's claim. 
Defendant's second claim fails because it is based largely on a misrepresentation 
of the record. Simply stated, there is no record support for defendant's allegations that 
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dilatory conduct by the prosecutor caused all of the delays in the proceedings. Because 
the record does not support defendant's claim, the claim fails. 
Point II. Defendant claims that his first trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to appear for the preliminary hearing on August 27,2003, and for not 
filing a 120-day disposition motion to dismiss. Defendant, however, did not raise this 
claim below, nor did he reserve his right to appeal the claim in his Sery pleas. Thus, 
defendant waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas, and this Court should not 
reach it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 120-
DAY DISPOSITION MOTION TO DISMISS, WHERE THE 
RECORD SHOWS THAT GOOD CAUSE SUPPORTED THE 
DELAY THAT PUSHED HIS PROCEEDINGS BEYOND THE 120-
DAY DISPOSITION PERIOD 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss under the 
Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act ("UMDDA"). Defendant argues, first, 
that the trial court erred "as a matter of law because it failed to address the State's 
statutorily imposed obligation to make a good faith effort to bring this matter to trial 
within 120 days." Aplt. Br. at 27. Defendant argues, second, that the trial court erred in 
attributing the majority of continuances in this case to defendant and, therefore, as not 
counting toward the 120-day disposition period. See id. at 27-32. 
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Defendant's first claim was not preserved by his Sery pleas and, therefore, should 
not be reached. Defendant's second claim fails on its merits.2 
A. The UMDDA. 
The UMDDA, now repealed, provides: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the 
state prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and 
there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is 
pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of 
delivery of written notice. 
• • • 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection 
(1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause 
shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, 
or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his 
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. 
If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, 
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall 
order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (West 2004). 
The UMDDA "places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecutor." 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1988). Thus, under the statute, "the prosecutor 
2For the Court's convenience, the State has attached copies of the relevant calendar 
years at Addendum B. 
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has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard within the statutory period." 
Id. "Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the court that a detainer notice has been 
filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." Id. 
The UMDDA, however, does not require dismissal of every case that fails to go to 
trial within the statutory 120 days. Rather, a defendant's motion to dismiss may be 
granted only if the trial court "finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous 
motion for continuance was made or not." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). Thus, "the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, 
with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable 
continuance." Id. at § 77-29-1(3). Moreover, the 120-day period may be extended by 
"relatively short delay[s] caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to 
trial" State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421,426 (Utah 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3). 
In addition, the "disposition period [is] extended by the amount of time during 
which defendant himself has created delay," State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 
1982), if "sufficient evidence" exists "to support a finding that, but for the defendant's 
actions, the trial would have been brought within the required disposition period." State 
v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, % 12,122 P.3d 561; accord Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; State v. 
Houston, 2003 UT App 416, ^ 11, 82 P.3d 219; State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 
1004-05 (Utah App. 1993). This is because "when a prisoner himself acts to delay the 
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trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial." 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; accord Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, f 11. "[G]ood cause" created 
by a defendant, therefore, may include actions by defendant such as "a plea change," 
"filing... motions to continue," "the failure to notify the court of the need to appoint new 
trial counsel," and even requesting a preliminary hearing. Hanker son, 2005 UT 47, \ 10 
accordBeaton, 958 P.2d at 916. 
The only requirements are that, when a continuance is granted, the prosecutor "has 
an affirmative obligation to ensure that good cause is 'shown in open court.'" State v. 
Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,\15, 71 P.3d 184. And the prosecutor has "an 
affirmative duty to request that the trial court make its determination of good cause in 
open court and to ask the court to create a record in support of its good cause 
determination." Id. 
Finally, a defendant's rights under the UMDDA are not always coterminous with 
the length of his proceedings. First, because a defendant's rights under the UMDDA are 
non-jurisdictional, see Wood v. State, 2005 UT App 483U (in UMDDA case, holding that 
"[t]he right to a speedy trial is nonjurisdictional"), a defendant may waive further 
assertion of his UMDDA rights at any time, "as he could any other nonjurisdictional 
error." State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that, because 
speedy trial rights under related Interstate Agreement on Detainers are not jurisdictional, 
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defendant may waive them). In such instances, the defendant is entitled to dismissal of 
the pending charges only if the 120-day disposition period expired before his waiver. 
Alternatively, a defendant's rights under the UMDDA may expire before trial if he 
is released from prison and, therefore, no longer "a prisoner [] serving a term of 
imprisonment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); see also State v. Harris, 540 A.2d 395, 
398 (Conn. App. 1988) (holding that intrastate statute no longer applies once defendant is 
released from prison because "when a defendant is not serving a criminal sentence there 
is no rehabilitation process to upset" and, thus, "no compelling reason why he should [be] 
afforded a trial within the [statutory time period]"); State v. Julian, 765 P.2d 1104, 1107-
08 (Kan. 1988) (holding that, once a defendant is released from prison, he "no longer 
ha[s] the right to rely upon the speedy trial provisions of the [UMDDA]"); State v. 
Oxendine, 473 A.2d 1311,1314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (holding that UMDDA does 
not apply once prisoner is released because "neither an expeditious nor a dilatory 
disposition of the charges pending against him could affect his status as a prisoner"); 
State v. Harris, 108 S.W.3d 127, 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) ("Once a defendant is released 
from prison within the [statutorily-defined disposition period] of the UMDD[A], he or she 
loses the benefit of the statute."); and see also Cunningham v. State, 14 S.W.3d 869, 871 
(Ark. 2000); Pristavec v. State, 496 A.2d 1036,1038-39 (Del. 1985); State v. Butler, 496 
So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 
566-69 (Ky. 2001); State v. Bellino, 557 A.2d 963, 964 (Me. 1989); State v. Burnett, 798 
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A.2d 96,99 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); State v. Dunlap, 290 S.E.2d 744, 746 (N.C. 
App. 1982); State v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ohio Ct App. 1984); State v. 
Foster, 812 P.2d 440,441 (Or. Ct App. 1991); State v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 338, 341 (S.D. 
1984),3 Consequently, a defendant who invokes his rights under the UMDDA but is then 
released from prison is entitled to dismissal of the pending charges only if the 120-day 
disposition period expired before his release. 
Thus, determining whether charges should have been dismissed under the 
UMDDA generally requires a two-step inquiry. See Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, % 6. 
"'First, [a court] must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it 
expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, [the court] must then 
determine whether "good cause" excused the delay.'" Id. (quoting Heaton, 958 P.2d at 
916). Where, as here, defendant both waived his UMDDA rights and was released from 
prison before trial, however, the second step of the inquiry is slightly modified to require 
that, "if the [waiver or release occurred] outside the 120-day period, [the court] must then 
determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay" up to the waiver or release. Id. 
3Although some of these cases address a defendant's rights under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which governs a prisoner's right to have outstanding 
charges in another state addressed, numerous courts have held that the UMDDA and the 
IAD "embody like policies." People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 n.2 (Colo. 1986) 
(en banc). "[B]eing component parts of the same general system they should be 
construed together to the extent possible." State v. Holley, 571 A.2d 892, 895 n.5 (Md. Ct 
Spec. App. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Olson, 
705 P.2d 1387,1389 (Ariz. Ct App. 1985); State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 
356-37 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). 
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B. Defendant's claim that the trial court's ruling was erroneous as 
a matter of law fails where he did not expressly preserve that 
claim below. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying his motion 
to dismiss. Although opaque, defendant's argument appears to be that, before the trial 
court could deny his motion on its merits, the court had to expressly find that the 
prosecutor had met her "statutorily imposed obligation to make a good faith effort to 
bring this matter to trial within 120 days." Aplt. Br. at 27. Specifically, defendant seems 
to argue, the trial court had to expressly find that the prosecutor "notified] the district 
court that a detainer notice had been filed," that the prosecutor "ma[d]e a good faith effort 
to bring this matter to trial within 120 days," and that the prosecutor "requested] the trial 
court to make any determination of good cause for delay in open court as required under 
[the UMDDA]." Id. at 26-27. Defendant's claim fails because he did not raise it, let 
alone expressly preserve it, below.4 
"The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is 
that by pleading guilty," a defendant "waives all nonjurisdictional defects." State v. 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, \ 15, 167 P.3d 1046; accord State v. Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, 
4In the course of his argument, defendant makes several allegations in support of 
his claim that the prosecutor "made no effort to bring this matter to trial within 120 days." 
Aplt. Br. at 26-27. These allegations, however, are not relevant to whether the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in not making the findings concerning the prosecutor's burdens 
under the UMDDA. Thus, the State does not address defendant's allegations in this part 
of its argument. The State will address defendant's allegations, instead, in the next part 
of its argument, when it responds to his challenge to the trial court's good cause findings. 
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f 6,157 P.3d 826. The only exception to this general rule is "where claims of error are 
expressly preserved for appeal." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, [^ 15; accord Hogue, 2007 UT 
App 86, f 6; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i). Thus, even when a defendant expressly 
reserves the right to challenge a trial court's adverse ruling through a Sery plea, he may 
challenge that ruling only on the bases preserved below. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, 
f 6 (holding that defendant's reservation of right to appeal trial court's suppression ruling 
did not include right to challenge qualifications of expert who testified at suppression 
hearing, where defendant did not object to expert's qualifications below). 
In this case, defendant never asked the trial court to make findings concerning 
whether the prosecutor adequately fulfilled her burdens under the UMDDA (R. 163-64, 
230-36; R. 416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). He also did not "expressly preserve[] for appeal" 
this claim when he entered his Sery pleas. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61,^15. Defendant, 
therefore, waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas. See id.; Hogue, 2007 UT 
App 86, Tf 6. Consequently, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court, and this 
Court should refuse to reach it. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86,16.5 
5Even assuming defendant may raise a claim for the first time on appeal from a 
Sery plea, this Court still should not reach defendant's claim here. "'Generally speaking, a 
timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order to preserve an issue for 
appeal.'" State v. Winfield 2006 UT 4, % 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Finder, 2005 
UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551; citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346). 
"When a party raises an issue on appeal without having properly preserved the issue 
below,... the party must argue either 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstance.' " 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^  14 (quoting Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45) (additional citation and 
quotation marks omitted). If a defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional 
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C. Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in 
ruling that good cause supported the delays in defendant's 
proceedings fails where the record supports the trial court's 
ruling. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss was 
erroneous because the court improperly attributed delays in the proceedings to him. See 
Aplt. Br. at 27-32. According to defendant, most of those delays were either sought "to 
accommodate the prosecutor" or were forced upon defendant by "dilatory conduct on the 
part of the State." Id. at 27,29. Defendant's claim, which relies heavily on 
misrepresentations of the record, lacks merit. 
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies review of the issue," this Court will "decline to 
consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); see also 
Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45. In this case, defendant does not argue either exceptional 
circumstances or plain error. See Aplt. Br. at 23-32. Thus, this Court should "decline to 
consider [defendant's claim] on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
Even on its merits, defendant's claim fails. To establish plain error, defendant 
must show that '"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error was harmful.'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, TJ16, 94 
P.3d 186 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). "To establish 
that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [defendant] must show that the 
law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, K 16, 95 P.3d 276; see also State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah 
App. 1998); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). In this case, defendant 
does not cite a single legal authority clearly requiring a trial court to make the findings he 
now claims the court should have made. See Aplt. Br. at 23-32. Thus, even assuming 
arguendo that the trial court erred in not making those findings, defendant has not shown 
that the error was obvious. See Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 16; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36; Baker, 963 P.2d at 805; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Thus, defendant 
has not shown plain error. 
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As stated, determining whether charges should have been dismissed under the 
UMDDA generally requires a two-step inquiry. See Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, \ 6. 
"'First, [a court] must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it 
expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, [the court] must then 
determine whether "good cause" excused the delay.'" Id. (quoting Heaton, 958 P.2d at 
916). This Court reviews a trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion and "'will find 
abuse of discretion where there is no reasonable basis in the record to support the trial 
court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of "good cause.'"" Houston, 2003 UT App 
416, f 7 (quoting Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,13, abrogated on other grounds, State v. 
Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, ffl[ 9, 12,122 P.3d 561 )(additional citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The 120-day period in this case began on May 5,2003, when the Utah State Prison 
received defendant's 120-day disposition request (R. 21). Absent any extensions for good 
cause, therefore, the 120-day period expired on August 31, 2003.6 Because a trial was not 
held by August 31, 2003, this Court must proceed to the second step in the UMDDA 
analysis, determining whether "good cause" excused the delay. 
In this case, however, defendant's 120-day disposition period expired when he 
waived his UMDDA rights on November 10,2003 (R. 412:5-6). See Brocksmith, 888 
6Although the parties agreed, and the trial court found, that the 120-day disposition 
period expired on September 3,2003, the State's calculations on appeal indicate that the 
period expired on August 31,2003. 
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P.2d at 705; Wood, 2005 UT App 483U. Alternatively, the disposition period expired 
when defendant was released from prison on January 13,2004 (R. 409:Tab 5:1; R. 81-82; 
PSI at 7). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); Cunningham, 14 S.W.3d at 871; Harris, 540 
A.2d at 398; Pristavec, 496 A.2d at 1038-39; Butler, 496 So. 2d at 917; Julian, 765 P.2d 
at 1107-08; Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 566-69; Bellino, 557 A.2d at 964; Oxendine, 473 
A.2d at 1314; Harris, 108 S.W.3d at 128; Burnett, 798 A.2d at 99; Dunlap, 290 S.E.2d at 
746; Thompson, 483 N.E.2d at 1210; Foster, 812 P.2d at 441; Smith, 353 N. W.2d at 341. 
Thus, the only question before this Court is whether good cause existed to extend 
defendant's proceedings beyond November 10,2003, or, in the alternative, January 13, 
2004. In this case, the trial court properly ruled that good cause justified the delay of 
defendant's proceedings beyond both of those dates. 
1. June 10, 2003 continuance. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that good cause supported the 
continuance of the preliminary hearing on June 10, 2003. See Aplt. Br. at 27, 29. 
According to defendant, the continuance should have counted toward the 120-day 
disposition period because it was both "requested by the prosecutor" and granted "to 
accommodate the prosecutor because the State had 13-14 witnesses." Aplt. Br. at 27 
(citing R. 409:1); see also id. at 29-30 (citing R. 409:2). 
Nothing in the record, however, establishes the prosecutor as the originator of the 
continuance motion. The minute entry from June 10 does not identify the moving party. 
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Rather, it merely states that, "[b]ased on the cal[e]nd[a]r being so full today, counsel 
request this preliminary hearing be set over as a special setting, as the state has 11 victims 
that need to testify" (R. 24-25). Nor does the transcript of the June 10 hearing clearly 
establish the moving party. To the extent it gives any hint, however, the transcript shows 
that it was defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who presented the motion to the trial court 
(R. 409:1). And, at the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, both 
defendant's former counsel and the prosecutor merely stated that the continuance was one 
to which both parties had stipulated (R. 416:62,104-05; R. 417:4). 
Moreover, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that the 
continuance was granted solely "to accommodate the prosecutor." Aplt. Br. at 27, 29. As 
stated, the minute entry from the June 10 hearing merely states that, "[b]ased on the 
cal[e]nd[a]r being so full today, counsel request this preliminary hearing be set over as a 
special setting, as the state has 11 victims that need to testify" (R. 24-25). And defense 
counsel testified at the motion hearing that both counsel had requested a continuance not, 
as defendant claims, "to accommodate the prosecutor because the State had 13-14 
witnesses," Aplt. Br. at 27, but simply because there "wasn't enough time to do the 
hearing" that day (R. 416:62). 
In sum, the record shows that the June 10 continuance was granted at both parties' 
request because, as a practical matter, there just "wasn't enough time to do the hearing" 
on that day (R. 416:62). This record constitutes a "reasonable basis . . . to support the 
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trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of 'good cause.'" Houston, 2003 UT App 
416, Tf 7 (citations omitted). Thus, defendant's challenge to the trial court's determination 
fails. 
2. July 14,2003 and July 28,2003 continuances. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's determinations that good cause 
supported the July 14,2003 and July 28,2003 continuances of his preliminary hearing. 
Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing R. 24-25, 26-29). According to defendant, the record does not 
support these rulings "because the State sought stipulation[s]" to continue the hearing 
"and then passively waited for the federal government to bring charges against Mr. 
Larson." Id. 
Again, nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that the State was the sole 
party seeking these continuances. In fact, neither of the minute entries cited by defendant 
in support of his claim identify the party who moved for the continuances. See id. (citing 
R. 26-29). Moreover, transcripts from the July 14 and the July 28 hearings identify 
defense counsel as the moving party, to see whether the federal government was going to 
charge defendant in this matter (R. 409:Tab2:l; R. 409:Tab 3:1). And, although the 
prosecutor indicated at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss that the continuances 
were in part for her benefit to "determin[e] what jurisdiction a particular criminal episode 
. . . is going to be heard under" (R. 416:105), defense counsel also indicated that the 
continuances would benefit his client (R. 409:Tab 3:1). As defense counsel explained at 
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the July 28 hearing, if the federal government decided to charge defendant, "the State [is] 
going to dismiss on this" (Id). 
Finally, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that, after the 
continuances were granted, the prosecutor "passively waited for the federal government 
to bring charges against [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing R. 26-29). The minute 
entries cited by defendant do not address the issue and, thus, lend no support for his 
claim. More importantly, the transcripts from July 14 and July 28 directly contradict it. 
On July 14, when defense counsel requested the first continuance, the prosecutor 
specifically stated that she had "been pretty aggressive with the U.S. Attorney's office to 
try to get them to make a decision" and that she would "call [the] U.S. Attorney... again 
today" (R. 409:Tab 2:1). And, on July 28, when defense counsel requested the second 
continuance, the prosecutor again stated that she had "been diligently trying to get an 
answer from the U.S. Attorney's Office and I'm going to continue to do that" (R. 
409:Tab3:l). 
In sum, nothing in the record supports defendant's claims that the prosecutor 
sought the July 14 and July 28 continuances and then passively prolonged those delays. 
To the contrary, the record shows that both parties sought the continuances for the 
reasonable purpose of determining whether the federal government was going to pursue 
charges against defendant; and the record shows that the prosecutor aggressively sought a 
determination by the federal government of that issue. Again, therefore, the record 
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provides a "reasonable basis . . . to support the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute 
determination^] of 'good cause'" as to each of the continuances. Houston, 2003 UT App 
416, f 7 (citations omitted). Thus, defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
determinations fail. 
3. August 27,2003 continuance. 
Defendant next challenges the trial court's ruling that good cause supported the 
continuance of the preliminary hearing on August 27, 2003, when defense counsel failed 
to appear. See Aplt. Br. at 30. In challenging the court's ruling, defendant focuses 
specifically on the magistrate's determination that the absence of defense counsel 
constituted a waiver of defendant's 120-day disposition rights. See id. According to 
defendant, the conclusion "that an attorney can waive a defendant's right to a speedy trial 
over his client's objection is incorrect as a matter of law." Id. Defendant's claim fails for 
at least two reasons. 
First, defendant's claim fails because it is inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's brief "shall contain . . . 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Under this rule, "a 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald 
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citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). And, because this Court 
"will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth5 on behalf of defendants," 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990), when a defendant fails to present 
any relevant authority, this Court will "decline to find it for him," State v. Pritchett, 2003 
UT 24, % 12, 69 P.3d 1278. Rather, this Court will simply "decline to considered 
inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998). 
In this case, defendant does not cite any legal authority supporting his claim that 
the magistrate's ruling was "incorrect as a matter of law." Aplt. Br. at 30. Thus, 
defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Pritchett, 2003 
UT 24,1| 12; Gomez, 2002 UT 120,1f 20; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Webb, 790 P.2d at 72 
n.2. This Court, therefore, should decline to reach it. See Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549. 
Second, defendant's claim fails because the trial court's ruling concerning the 
August 27,2003 continuance was not based on defense counsel's waiver of defendant's 
UMDDA rights. (R. 240) Rather, it was based on its determination that "[t]here was good 
cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing" due to "defense counsel's failure to appear" (Id). 
And, whether or not the magistrate properly ruled that defense counsel's failure to appear 
constituted a waiver of defendant's UMDDA, resolution of that issue does not undermine 
the reasonableness of the trial court's good cause determination. 
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Defense counsel's failure to appear at the August 27 preliminary hearing was an 
"unforseen problemf]." Peterson, 810 P.2d at 426 (holding that trial court may find good 
cause where "relatively short delay[s] [are] caused by unforeseen problems arising 
immediately prior to trial"). Where defendant had the right to counsel at his preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate's decision to continue the hearing so that counsel could be present 
was not only reasonable, but—unless defendant was willing to waive his right to counsel, 
which he never indicated he was willing to do—absolutely necessary. See, e.g., State v. 
Curry, 2006 UT App 390, f 9 & n.3, 147 P.3d 483 (holding that "[c]ritical stages of a 
criminal proceeding" at which defendant has constitutional right to counsel "include . . . 
preliminary hearing); see also State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985) (holding 
that good cause supported trial court's continuance of trial over defendant's objection, 
"where defense counsel was ill on the date scheduled for trial"); State v. Trujillo, 656 
P.2d 403,404 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (holding that good cause supported continuance 
of trial, where trial "was continued only because of the complication resulting from the 
co-defendant['s] change of plea at the last minute"). 
Thus, defendant's contention that the trial court erred in finding good cause for the 
August 27 continuance of his preliminary hearing lacks merit. 
4. Continuances granted between November 10,2003 and August 13, 
2004. 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the November 10, 
2003 and February 20, 2004 continuances of his trial were supported by good cause. See 
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Aplt. Br. at 26,28-31. According to defendant, these delays were caused solely by the 
prosecutor, who refused to provide "critical DNA evidence to the defense . . . , thereby 
making it impossible for Mr. Larson to proceed to trial." Aplt. Br. at 31.7 
Defendant, however, waived his future rights to a 120-day disposition at the 
November 10,2003 hearing (R. 412:5-6). Thus, this Court need not determine whether 
good cause supported either of the continuances at issue. Rather, because 120 days had 
not expired by November 10,2003, this Court may simply affirm the trial court's denial 
of defendant's dismissal motion. 
Alternatively, defendant's rights to a 120-day disposition expired when he was 
released from prison on January 13,2004 (R. 409:Tab 5:1; R. 81-82; PSI at 7). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); Cunningham, 14 S.W.3d at 871; Harris, 540 A.2d at 398; 
Pristavec, 496 A.2d at 1038-39; Butler, 496 So. 2d at 917; Julian, 765 P.2d at 1107-08; 
Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 566-69; Bellino, 557 A.2d at 964; Oxendine, 473 A.2d at 1314; 
Harris, 108 S.W.3d at 128; Burnett, 798 A.2d at 99; Dunlap, 290 SJE.2d at 746; 
Thompson, 483 N.E.2d at 1210; Foster, 812 P.2d at 441; Smith, 353 N.W.2d at 341. 
7Although defendant does not specify these two continuances in his argument, see 
Aplt. Br. at 30-32, these are the only two continuances granted after defendant's 
preliminary hearing that were caused by defense counsel's need for DNA evidence (R. 
412:3-4; R. 413:11-13,14). The remaining continuances were granted because defendant 
sought to dismiss appointed counsel in favor of private counsel (R. 414:3-5, 9; R. 
409:Tab 7:1-2), and then was appointed conflict counsel (R. 409:Tab 8:1-3; R. 145-46). 
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Thus, this Court need address only defendant's challenge to the November 10,2003 
continuance. 
In any case, defendant's challenges to the trial court's rulings lack merit. 
Defendant's waiver claim. Defendant first argues that the trial court's rulings were 
erroneous because, on both November 10,2003 and February 20,2004, the trial court 
"coerced and forced [him] to waive his [120-day disposition] right by unjustly placing 
him in the impossible position of giving up his speedy trial remedy or going to trial 
unprepared." Aplt. Br. at 30-31. The trial court's rulings concerning these continuances, 
however, were not based on defendant's waiver of his UMDDA rights (R. 240-41). 
Rather, the court's rulings were based on defense counsel's requests for continuances 
(Id.). Consequently, defendant's argument addresses an issue that was irrelevant to the 
trial court's rulings. And, because it was irrelevant, this Court need not reach it. 
Moreover, defendant never challenged the validity of his waivers below (R. 163-
64,230-36; R. 416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). Thus, the argument he now raises wras not 
"expressly preserved for appeal" by his Sery pleas. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 15. 
Consequently, defendant's argument is not properly before this Court, and this Court 
should refuse to reach it. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, f 6.8 
8Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim, the claim would fail. Because 
defendant did not raise this claim below, he was required to argue "that 'exceptional 
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies review of the issue." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 
n.5; Pinder, 2005 UT 15, H 45. Because defendant does not argue either of these 
doctrines, see Aplt. Br. at 31-32, this Court should "decline to consider [defendant's 
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Defendant's good cause claim. Alternatively, defendant argues that the trial 
court's rulings were erroneous because the continuances granted on November 10,2003 
and February 20,2004 were caused solely by the prosecutor, who refused to provide 
"critical DNA evidence to the defense . . . , thereby making it impossible for Mr. Larson to 
proceed to trial." Aplt. Br. at 31; see also id. at 26, 28-29. Specifically, defendant asserts 
that, "[a]t the time of the October 8,2003 preliminary hearing, which was well beyond the 
initial 120 days, the State had not even provided a copy of the crime lab report to the 
claim] on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Pinder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45. 
Alternatively, defendant's claim fails because he has not shown plain error. As 
stated, to show that an error should have been obvious, defendant "must show that the law 
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." Dean, 2004 UT 
63,f16. Here, defendant cites only one case from a foreign jurisdiction to support his 
contention that a court may not force a defendant to waive his rights to a speedy trial in 
return for a continuance requested because his trial counsel is unprepared for trial. See 
Aplt. Br. at 31 (citing Hunt v. Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
trial court deprived defendant of right to effective assistance of counsel when, after 
appointing counsel just minutes before trial, court forced defendant to either waive 
statutory right to speedy trial or proceed to trial with unprepared counsel; suggesting that 
"element of coerced choice" between constitutional right to counsel and statutory right to 
speedy trial was "'intolerable'")). A single decision by a foreign court, however, does not 
establish "that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was 
made." Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 16. This is especially so where the court in Hunt relied on a 
Fourth Amendment case—Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), in which the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing could not be 
used against him at trial—that the Supreme Court itself has essentially limited to its facts. 
See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 210-13 (1971) (distinguishing Simmons 
from cases in which "we held the defendants bound by 'waivers' of [constitutional] rights 
. . . made in order to avoid burdens which, it was ultimately determined, could not 
constitutionally have been imposed"). And, this is especially so where defendant here— 
because he waived his right to a speedy trial, not his right to effective assistance of 
counsel—was not forced to go to trial, as was Hunt, with unprepared counsel. 
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defense." Aplt. Br. at 28 (citing R. 416:74). Then, "[w]hen defense counsel requested 
the DNA evidence from the prosecutor..., the prosecutor not only would not provide it 
but told defense counsel he had to obtain that evidence by subpoenaing the crime lab." 
Id. at 28-29 (citing R. 416:76-77). And, defendant claims, "[w]hen defense counsel did 
so, the state crime lab responded with a letter delaying the matter even further, stating 'it 
was going to take them sometime to get the information together.'" Id. at 29 (citing R. 
416:76-77). Defendant concludes that, "[b]ecause this information had already been 
provided to the prosecutor and admitted at the preliminary hearing, this dilatory conduct 
on the part of the State was unwarranted and it served only to unnecessarily delay 
[defendant's] trial even further." Id. 
Again, however, defendant never claimed below that the continuances in his trial 
were caused by the prosecution's withholding of DNA evidence (R. 163-64, 230-36; R. 
416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). Consequently, defendant's claim was not preserved in his Sery 
plea, and this Court should refuse to reach it. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, f 15; Hogue, 
2007 UTApp 86,^6. 
In any case, the record does not support defendant's claim. First, nothing in the 
record supports defendant's claim that "the State had not even provided a copy of the 
crime lab report to the defense" by the time of defendant's preliminary hearing. Aplt. Br. 
at 28. As support for his claim, defendant cites defense counsel's testimony from the 
hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. See id. (citing R. 416:74). To the extent 
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counsel's testimony sheds any light on the matter, however, the testimony indicates that, 
indeed, defense counsel had gotten the DNA report "from the State" early in the process 
(R. 416:74). And, counsel's testimony is consistent with his request for discovery, filed 
on or about April 28, 2003, which included a request for "[a]ny reports or results of 
scientific tests taken during the investigation of this case" (R. 16). 
As defense counsel explained, the problem was that, to prepare for trial, defense 
counsel wanted not only the report, but the "hard data" underlying the report (R. 416:73). 
And, contrary to defendant's claim, nothing in the record suggests that "this information 
had. . . been provided to the prosecutor and admitted at the preliminary hearing." Aplt. 
Br. at 29. The only DNA evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was the crime 
lab's DNA report; nothing in the preliminary hearing transcript suggests that the State had 
any other DNA evidence at that time (R. 411:84). 
Nor does anything in the record suggest, as defendant does, that the prosecutor was 
"dilatory" in providing that "hard data," once defendant requested it. Rather, the record 
establishes only that the prosecutor advised defendant to follow the apparently normal 
course for obtaining that evidence—which was to request it from the body that had it, the 
crime lab. As defense counsel testified, he had three DNA cases at the time and he "made 
a request, a supplemental motion request to the District Attorney's Office in all three 
cases and got the same—basically the same response in all three, was that I had to ask the 
crime lab" (R. 416:76) (emphasis added). 
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Next, defendant cites the crime lab's letter "saying it was going to take them 
sometime to get the information together" as evidence of "dilatory conduct on the part of 
the [prosecutor]" that "was unwarranted and.. . served only to unnecessarily delay [his] 
trial even further." Aplt. Br. at 29. However, defendant provides no evidence to support 
his accusation. Aplt. Br. at 29. Specifically, there is no record evidence establishing how 
long it normally takes the crime lab to produce the "hard data" underlying a DNA report. 
Thus, there is also no record evidence supporting defendant's contention that the delay 
caused by the crime lab was either "unwarranted" or "unnecessar[y]." Aplt. Br. at 29. 
Finally, to the extent defendant's accusations imply that the prosecutor had a duty 
under the UMDDA to anticipate defendant's DNA defense, to do all the discovery 
necessary to prepare that defense, and to have that discovery ready in the event defendant 
requested it, such a duty far exceeds the State's duty to disclose evidence in a typical 
criminal case. See Pinder, 2005 UT 15, fflf 22-27 (holding that State's duty to disclose 
evidence in criminal case requires only disclosure that evidence exists and where it may 
be found, not disclosure of evidence itself). And defendant cites absolutely no legal 
authority suggesting that the UMDDA imposes such a burden on the prosecutor. See 
Aplt. Br. at 25-32. 
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's rulings that good cause supported delay 
in defendant's trial on November 10,2003 and February 20,2004, therefore, fails. 
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In conclusion, defendant has not demonstrated any error in the trial court's ruling 
that good cause supported the delays of defendant's proceedings. Defendant's challenge 
to the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss based on those delays, therefore, fails. 
H. THIS COURT MAY NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM WHERE HE DID NOT RAISE 
IT BELOW OR RESERVE IT IN HIS SERYFLEAS 
Defendant claims that his first trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to appear at the August 27, 2003 preliminaiy hearing and failing to file a motion to 
dismiss under the UMDDA. See Aplt. Br. at 34. Defendant, however, did not raise an 
ineffective assistance claim below or reserve it as an issue for appeal when he entered his 
Sery pleas. Consequently, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court, and this 
Court should refuse to reach it. 
As stated, "[t]he general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are 
legion, is that by pleading guilty," a defendant "waives all nonjurisdictional defects." 
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, % 15, 167 P.3d 1046; accord State v. Hogue, 2007 UT 
App 86, Tf 6. The only exception to this general rule is "where claims of error are 
expressly preserved for appeal." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, % 15; accord Hogue, 2007 UT 
App 86, f 6; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i). Thus, even when a defendant expressly 
preserves the right to challenge a trial court's adverse ruling through a Sery plea, he may 
challenge that ruling only on the bases preserved below. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, 
f 6 (holding that defendant's reservation of right to appeal trial court's suppression ruling 
37 
did not include right to raise for the first time on appeal ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim based in counsel's failure to challenge qualifications of expert who testified at 
suppression hearing). 
In this case, defendant never raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
below (R. 163-64,230-36; R. 416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). He also did not "expressly 
preserve[] for appeal" an ineffective assistance claim. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, \ 15. 
Defendant, therefore, waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas. Id.; see also 
Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, f 6. 
Consequently, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court, and this Court 
should refuse to reach it. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, f 6. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial 
court's ruling on defendant's 120-day disposition motion and to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this Itfiday of April, 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: ^ » 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily iiyury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of thg pending charge, he shall he entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) £ri the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action* the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
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